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REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES.

The Dialogues of Plato. Translated into English, with Analyses and Introductions, by B. JOWETT. Third edition. Revised and corrected throughout. New York, Macmillan & Co., 1892.

The appearance of the third and definitive edition of Jowett's Plato, with introductions, analyses, résumés of analyses, head-lines, marginal analysis and 175 pages of index, recalls to mind Mr. Bright's saying of the first edition that it was a more marvellous achievement of the human intellect than the original composition of the dialogues. This is not quite so. But it would not be easy to name any original book of the last twenty years that has exerted a wider or more salutary influence on the thought of the age. In its new and improved form, its manifold contents made accessible to the most hurried reader by every device of the printer's art, the work will remain an ever open source of idealistic inspirations, a rich storehouse of suggestion to literary workers of every description.

The translation now, after two careful revisions and the pains bestowed upon it by the band of scholars whose aid is cordially acknowledged in the preface, is substantially correct—correct, that is, within the limits set by the translator's aims and methods. There still remain, as I shall note hereafter, a certain number of what seem to me positive errors of interpretation. But it would be grossly unfair for the critic to swell this list by including in it all the minor 'betrayals' of his original into which the translator is inevitably led by his method of "reducing the two languages to terms of each other" and allowing the precise order of the Greek words to fade from his mind. It is no part of Professor Jowett's design to reveal to us how he construes the Greek, and it would be mere pedantry on the part of the critic to assume the rod of the schoolmaster. There remain, then, for consideration, Professor Jowett's theory of translation and its application to the problem of translating Plato; the interpretations of the Platonic philosophy suggested rather than set forth in the introductions, and lastly the enumeration of some positive errors of detail that have escaped the eyes of the translator and his coadjutors. But before attempting to play the critic one would gladly pay his little tribute of admiration to this noble literary monument of a long and noble life. *Μοιήσεται τις μάλλον ἢ μωήσεται.* The critic may carp at details, and versions of single dialogues may be published that will better please particular classes of readers, scholars, 'aesthetes,' students of philosophy; but the work as a whole will remain a permanent contribution to English literature that will not easily be superseded. It is not given to every man to compose (in original or in translation) five volumes of English prose of unfailing propriety, lucidity and charm, never deviating into vulgarity or rhetoric, but always preserving as by Hellenic instinct the just mean and the exquisite urbanity of the best literary society.

If we except the English Bible, it is probably safe to say that no modern literature possesses any translation of like extent and literary excellence.

Professor Jowett is especially successful in reproducing the little pictures of Greek life that serve as a stage for the unfolding of the argument, or the dramatic by-play of high comedy or uproarious farce that accompanies and relieves the severity of the dialectic. What can be more admirable than the opening scene of the Charmides—the press of Greek youths thronging about the reigning beauty and Socrates just returned from the camp at Potidaea?—or the Palaestra of the Lysis and Lysis himself “standing with the other boys and youths, having a crown upon his head like a fair vision” (pity ‘fair vision’ is not in the Greek); or the Homeric review of the gathering of the Sophists in the Protagoras; or the kindly old age of Cephalus—a portrait of the just man ending his days in peace, with honor, love, obedience, troops of friends, set in the forefront of the Republic, a practical confirmation of the conclusion to which the argument will bring us ‘after it has gone a long and weary way.’ Very admirable, too, are Professor Jowett’s reproductions of the lofty strain of Socratic irony in the Gorgias—the idealist against the world; the roaring farce of the Euthydemus; the amusing description of what befell the ‘notable device of the scythe-spear’ in the Laches; the Aristophanic account of the original man-woman in the Symposium; the humors of democracy in the Republic; the friendly banter of Socrates and Phaedrus by the Ilissus, and the solemn jests of the Sophist and Statesman. And in a loftier, more serious vein, where shall we look for anything finer than the beautiful description of the Ilissus or the allegory of the Chariot and two Steeds in the Phaedrus, or the death of Socrates, or the myth at the close of the Gorgias?

There are also countless single felicities of diction and clever paraphrases to delight the lovers of neat translations and edify students of the ingenious art of Greek prose composition. E. g. Phaedr. 245 C *ἡ δὲ δὴ ἀποδείξεις ἔσται δεινοῖς μὲν ἀπιστος σοφοῖς δὲ πιστή* “the proof shall be one which the wise will receive and the willing disbelieve”; 250 D *ταῦτα μὲν οὖν νηήμεν κεχαρίσθω*, etc., “let me linger over the memory of scenes that have passed away”; 256 E “will send you bowling round the earth during a period of nine thousand years and leave you a fool in the world below.” Symp. 191 *σύμβολον* “the indenture of a man”; 221 B *βρενθυόμενος* “stalking like a pelican.” Euthyphron 3 B *ὡς οὖν καινοτομοῦντός σου*, etc., “he thinks you a neologian.” Protag. 337–38 (speech of Hippias) “worthy of this height of dignity” (*ἀξιώματος*); *ibid.* “go forth on the gale with every sail set out of sight of land into an ocean of words.” Euthyd. 303 C *τῶν σεμνῶν δὴ*, etc., “grave and reverend seigniors”; *ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος* “the old, old song.” Meno 76 E *πραγικὴ γὰρ ἡ ἀπόκρισις* “in the orthodox, solemn vein.” Phaedr. 236 *ξίνες ὁ τοι λέγω* “wherefore perpend,” but in Meno 76 D “read my meaning.” Republic 519 A “But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their youth?” etc. Rep. 516 C “Wisdom of the den.” *ἔθελοδούλοις* “who hug their chains.”

The periphrases are sometimes really too fine, reminding one of nothing so much as of the comparative tables of idiom in the introductions to manuals of Greek prose composition. E. g. Symp. 129 “In the magnificent oration which you have just uttered” (*τοῦ λόγου*). Protag. 320 “at this unearthly hour” (*τηνικάδε*). Protag. 347 D “even though they are very liberal in their potations”

(κὰν πάνυ πολλὸν οἶνον πίωσιν). Lysis 209 "as much as he can take up between his fingers" (οὐδ' ἂν συγκρῶν). Rep. 466 A "But that as at present advised" (νῦν δέ); 531 A "'Tis as good as a play" (γελοῖως γε); 533 C "such a fabric of convention" (τὴν τοιαύτην ὁμολογίαν); 517 C "Those who attain to this beatific vision" (οἱ ἐνταῦθα ἐλθόντες); 551 D "another discreditable feature" (οὐδὲ τὸδε καλόν); 539 B "Taste the dear delight" (αὐτῶν γενέσθαι).

Professor Jowett affects these elegant periphrases with the avowed purpose of avoiding tautology, of which modern languages are less tolerant than the Greek. In the introduction to the Cratylus, speaking of the fear of tautology as one of the forces operative in language-growth, he says that "it seems to be a kind of impertinence to the reader, and strikes unpleasantly both on the mind and ear, that the same sounds should be used twice over when another word or turn of expression would have given a new shade of meaning to the thought, and would have added a pleasing variety to the sound." In illustration of this cf. Meno 73 E εἶποιμ' ἂν . . . οὕτως ἂν εἶποιμι "I might say . . . and I should adopt this mode of speaking." 86 C περὶ τούτου "this is a theme upon which." 91 D καὶ τοῦτω "and in return for this disservice." Gorgias 465 E ἔα με χρῆσθαι "let me have the benefit of your brevity," where the paraphrase has certainly "given a new shade of meaning to the thought." Phaedo 101 "For there is the same liability to error in all these cases" (ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ πον φόβος). Gorgias 512 B "or from any other devourer" (ἄλλοθεν ὀποθεοῦν). Rep. 376 A "The trait of which I am speaking" (καὶ τοῦτο).

Apt turns of expression are occasionally borrowed from the storehouse of Shakespeare or the Bible, though Professor Jowett holds that this is a resource of which the judicious translator should avail himself sparingly. Nothing could be happier than "she receives the *sensible warm motion* of particles that flow towards her," etc., for the *δεχομένη τὸν ἥμερον . . . θερμαίνεται*, etc., of Phaedr. 251 C. "And do they not share" is for those who catch the allusion an exquisite rendering of the οὐκοῦν μεταλαμβάνει of Rep. 565 A. The translator is less successful with his Falstaff in 566 C, where he attempts to reproduce the effect of the Homeric *κείται μέγας μεγαλωστί* by "larding the plain with his bulk." We catch the echoes of familiar quotations also in "continue of the same opinion still" (II 381); "flowers that bloom in the spring" (Rep. 475 A), which we fear is intentional, as it has been introduced since the second edition; "the sorrows of a poor old man" (I 476); "necessity, who is the mother of our invention" (III 49); "have everything handsome about them" (III 106); "refuse to speak of their pleasant vices" (Gorgias 502 B); "rehabilitate hippocentaurs and chimerae dire" (Phaedr. 229 E); "to the manner born of our muse" (I 559).

Yet despite Professor Jowett's brilliant success with it in practice, one is loth to accept his theory of translation. All that he says in his preface about slavish conformity to the original being the petty ambition of a schoolboy sounds plausible enough and might convince us, did not Munro's Lucretius exist to prove that the most scrupulous conformity to the original and a certain inevitableness in the rendering of each and every word are quite compatible with an English of the purest and noblest type. Ingenious, fluent, easy are the epithets we apply to Professor Jowett's renderings; we should never, I think, call them inevitable. He himself admits that to reproduce the movement and feeling of the original is the translator's ideal. But every scholar

must feel that he has sacrificed this to the fetich of an equable and conventional English style. Anxious to avoid the usual failing of translations—contamination with foreign idiom—he has, in his attempt to “form a general idea of the two languages and reduce one to terms of the other” chosen as his type of English that form of the literary language which bears least resemblance to the Greek language generally and to the style of Plato in particular. It is perfectly true that “good” modern English tends to throw off the adversative and inferential form; that it avoids elaborate periods and pronounced rhythms, and is intolerant of anacoluthon and tautology; and that archaisms, quotations and a consciously Saxon vocabulary impair the equability of a style. But English literature affords many models of style, from the prose of Milton and Hooker to that of De Quincey, Carlyle, Ruskin and Walter Pater, that in some or all of these respects are much better adapted to reproduce the effect of the Greek of Plato. The English reader of culture enjoys and appreciates these styles quite as much as his Addison, Swift or Macaulay. Why should he be compelled to read his Plato in a style that Lysias would have employed, had Lysias been a Saturday Reviewer? The translator’s statement that “in some respects it may be maintained that ordinary English writing, such as the newspaper article, is superior to Plato: at any rate, it is couched in language which is rarely obscure”—this portentous dictum, I say, makes one ask whether Professor Jowett is aware how much of the force and feeling of the original is lost in his fluent rewriting. A portion of Plato’s meaning may sometimes sleep in the ear of a careless reader or imperfect Grecian, but a chief charm of Plato’s style for the scholar is that it defines every nuance of feeling and thought with a precision of which the English language is incapable. This is accomplished by skilful arrangement and distribution of emphasis, the balanced or inferential opposition or parallelism of phrase and clause, and a consciously careful discrimination of synonyms. Hence, as Mr. Pater somewhere says, the best way to translate Plato is often to make sure of the right vocabulary and then to follow the windings of Plato’s thought in the order of the original words, careless of the formal coherence of the syntax. The translator who breaks up Plato’s periods into neat, crisp English sentences, and refuses to himself the license of anacoluthon, will inevitably misplace the emphasis and lose the rhythm of his original. If he does away with the inferential and adversative form and ignores the force of the particles, he sacrifices the logical evolution of the thought, which for Plato was often no less important than its substance. And by employing elegant periphrasis to avoid tautology he often wantonly alters emotional connotations and suggestions to which Plato attached the greatest significance.

This work, however, is much more than a translation. In the elaborate introductions to the dialogues, extending in some instances to more than two hundred pages, Professor Jowett undertakes not only to resume and interpret Plato’s thought, but to apply, I had almost said to ‘improve’ it (“Plato,” as he says, “admits of endless applications”), in relation to the entire life and culture of our day. These introductory essays, a notable feature of the first edition, received many additions in the second, and in the third, besides many alterations and improvements of detail, are enriched with supplementary discussions on *The New Science of Language*; *The Ideas of Plato* and

Modern Philosophy; The Decline of Greek Literature; The Scope of Psychology, etc., etc. To many readers the modernity, the breadth of view, the gentle wisdom, the playful urbanity, the veiled and evasive dogmatism in the treatment of great themes that mark these essays will seem hardly less attractive than the dialectic discussions they serve to introduce (*τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐκ ἀηδέστερα ἀκούειν*). What could be more exquisite than the little essay on Friendship prefixed to the *Lysis* (I 45); or the half-serious debate as to the relative advantages of a marriage of love and a marriage of convenience in the introduction to the *Phaedrus*; or the hints for the Platonic education of after-life (III ccxi); or, in a somewhat higher vein, the meditations on immortality in the introduction to the *Phaedo*; the portrait of the ideal philosopher of modern times (III lxxxviii); the reflections on the symbolism of the Platonic mythus (II 316-24); the picture of the world as it reflected itself in the conjectures of early Greek science (III 380 sqq.)? Who can read unmoved the lovely passage (unfortunately too long to quote, V ccxxxvii) in which the translator takes leave of his laborious task and reluctantly severs his lifelong communion with the spirit of the greatest teacher who has ever appealed to the reason of man? This beautiful page will remain classic: it marks the supreme perfection of nineteenth-century English prose.

Simple and unemphatic in style, these essays are yet thickly strewn with wise, pregnant or pretty sayings which the appreciative reader will note and of which a few may not unprofitably be collected here: "The moral and intellectual are always dividing, yet they must be re-united, and in the highest conception of them are inseparable" (I 127). "For he sees the marks of design in the world, but he no longer sees, or fancies that he sees, God walking in the garden or haunting stream or mountain" (III 427). "Governing for the people cannot easily be combined with governing by the people" (II 312). "In all things there is an element of convention; but the admission of this does not help us to understand the rational ground or basis in human nature on which the convention proceeds" (I 256). "The Symposium is Greek, having a beauty as of a statue . . . while the *Phaedrus* is marked by a sort of Gothic irregularity" (I 515). "It was easier to think of a former than of a future life, because such a life has really existed for the race, though not for the individual" (II 15). "'Piety is doing as I do' is the idea of religion which first occurs to him and to many others who do not say what they think with equal frankness" (II 71). "Good men are too honest to go out of the world professing more than they know" (II 180). "Nor need anything be excluded from the plan of a great work to which the mind is naturally led by the association of ideas and which does not interfere with the general purpose" (III iii). "No such inspired creation is at unity with itself, any more than the clouds of heaven when the sun pierces through them" (III vii). "Looking into the orb of light he sees nothing, but he is warmed and elevated" (III cxvi). "Habit is to the mind what the bones are to the body" (IV 178). "Astronomy and medicine were naturally connected in the minds of early thinkers because there was little or nothing in the space between them" (IV 432). "Evil is supposed to continue . . . a sort of mephitic vapor exhalng from some ancient chaos" (IV 434).

These essays, however, claim to be much more than a series of miscellaneous

reflections and happy sayings about Plato and Platonism. They offer a complete, if designedly unsystematic, interpretation of the Platonic philosophy, and a critical examination of the entire scientific and philosophic effort of our time, touching lightly but with confident affirmation on every topic from prehistoric marriage to the future of science and the transmission of acquired qualities by heredity. With the synoptic gaze of the dialectician, Professor Jowett, from the vantage-ground of two generations of Oxford culture and the summits of the Platonic philosophy, surveys the labors of the present generation of scholars and thinkers with playful indulgence and finds them by no means all very good. The conclusion of the suggestive but somewhat rambling and inconclusive essay on the new science of language is that "Like some other branches of knowledge, it may be approaching a point at which it can no longer be profitably studied" (I 320). The essay on the nature and limits of psychology begins by saying that during the past twenty years "the subject has gained in breadth and extent; whether it has had any true growth is doubtful," and, after a clever summary of the obstacles to a scientific investigation of mind, either by self-scrutiny or study of the machinery of the body, concludes by offering to "rehabilitate psychology to some extent not as a branch of science, but as a collection of facts bearing on human life." And the essay on Hegelianism, while assigning Hegel an exalted place above other philosophers, assumes that "we know his method to be erroneous," and blasphemously says that "whatever came into his mind seemed to him to be a necessary truth." The young grammarians, the adherents of the new psychology and the Neo-Hegelians can be safely relied upon to defend themselves against the fleers of any Platonic *littérateur*. But Professor Jowett's easy-going belletristic treatment of the history of philosophy, and more especially of the Platonic philosophy, may fitly be animadverted upon here. His own attitude towards philosophy may be defined as a mild literary positivism tempered by an Hegelianism akin to that of Renan. "Most of the ancient puzzles," he says, "have been settled on the basis of usage and common sense, and there is no need to re-open them" (I 192). And again: "To continue dead or imaginary sciences which make no signs of progress and have no definite sphere tends to interfere with the prosecution of living ones." Like Hegel, he holds that self-contradiction is the logic of a higher order of truth, and he finds in the master "an emancipation nearly complete from the influences of the scholastic logic." Accordingly he denies the truth of the law of contradiction and avers that "the silliness of the so-called laws of thought has been well exposed by Hegel himself." For "unless we are willing to admit that two contradictories may be true, many questions which lie at the threshold of mathematics and morals will be insoluble puzzles to us." Plato, he thinks, may have dimly anticipated this great truth in his hint of a "longer way" (Rep. 435 D and 504), which is perhaps an intimation "of some metaphysic of the future which will not be satisfied with arguing from the principle of contradiction." But Plato, alas! does not attempt, like Hegel, to carry the ordinary mechanism of language and logic "into another region in which all oppositions are absorbed and all contradictions affirmed only that they may be done away with" (IV 316). For Plato "in the Symposium denies the possibility of reconciliation until the opposition has passed away," and in working

out his doctrine of not-being as a form of otherness he has "lost sight altogether of the other sense of not-being as the negative of being." The best answer to this rigmarole is supplied by two or three sentences from Plato himself. The first sentence, as regards the neglected sense of not-being, shall be the challenge of the Eleatic stranger in the *Sophist* 239 C: "Come, now, make a bold and manful attempt, bending every intellectual power to the feat, to deliver yourself of any true utterance about not-being without (implicitly) predicating of it essence or unity or number in any degree!" And for the law of contradiction and its abrogation by Hegel we may take *Republic* 436 D E, or, better yet, *Sophist* 259 C D (in Jowett's version): "Letting alone these puzzles as involving no difficulty, he should be able to follow and criticise in detail every argument, and when a man says that the same is in a manner other, or that other is the same, to understand and refute him from his own point of view, and in the same respect in which he asserts either of these affections. But to show that somehow and in some sense the same is other, or the other same, or the great small, or the like unlike; and to delight in always bringing forward such contradictions, is no real refutation, but is clearly the new-born babe of some one who is only beginning to approach the problem of being." If Professor Jowett had devoted to Schopenhauer some of the days and nights which he has consecrated to Hegel he would have remembered that the so-called laws of thought are merely the primary conventions of mutually intelligible speech; that their most general expression is: "At a given time and place and for the purposes of a given discourse every predicate either may or may not be affirmed of any subject"; and that it is as futile to speak of the silliness of these laws, or try to transcend them in quest of a higher logic, as it is to dwell upon them and magnify their significance with foolish wonder. But Professor Jowett is in reality only coquetting with Hegelianism for its literary effectiveness. An age of intellectual transition is necessarily an age of inconsistency, he tells us, and inconsistency, as we know from the example of Renan, lends an incomparable breadth of effect and piquancy to the treatment of great religious and philosophical themes. Professor Jowett has not formally adopted Renan's principle that "to contradict oneself frequently gives the best chance of being occasionally in the right," but he doubtless is faintly conscious of a certain artistic pleasure in the contrast between the positivistic reasoning in detail and the spiritualistic summing up of his essays on Immortality and on the Scope of Psychology, or in that between his demonstration that there is after all nothing in Hegelianism and his prodigal encomiums upon Hegel. And to take minor illustrations, there is a noble disdain of the pedant's ideal of consistency in affirming on one page (III cc) that Plato does not "assert in the *Republic* the involuntariness of vice" and telling us on the next page that "In the *Republic* he is evidently impressed with the conviction that vice arises chiefly from ignorance and may be cured by education." Or in saying in one place (I 17) that no mention occurs of the doctrine of ideas in the *Timaeus*, in another (I 13) that the ideas are transformed into demons, and in a third (III 346) that "the ideas remain, but that they have become types in nature."

But we are not here concerned with Professor Jowett's philosophic consistency, nor do we care to defend ontology and metaphysics against his scept-

ticism. We cordially concur with him in the belief that we want only enough metaphysics to dispel the illusions of metaphysics, though we think he does not realize the full force of his admission that it requires a good deal of metaphysics to get rid of metaphysics, and can hardly be aware how much metaphysics would be needed to reconcile with what seems to be his own final faith his assertion that "it is probable, or indeed certain, that of many mental phenomena there are no mental antecedents, but only bodily ones" (IV 183). But because metaphysics is an unreal science we must not infer that truth and error are meaningless terms as applied to statements about the history of philosophy. The life and growth of metaphysical systems, whatever their objective validity, like that of other products of the human spirit, is a subject for scientific investigation. They are to be studied partly by the historic method, and partly by an *a priori* analysis of the limited number of possible combinations of the main facts of human experience external and internal. That is to say, any given philosophical system is to be explained partly by reference to the science and religion of the age that gave it birth and the experience and reading of its author, and partly by analyzing it into its elements and finding in them some one of the few eternal problems of thought (or verbal puzzles, if you will, τῶν λόγων . . . ἀγῆρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν) that are no nearer solution to-day than they were in the time of Plato.

The historian of philosophy cannot escape the necessity of this analysis by asserting that these ancient puzzles have only an historic significance for us now; nor by calling them epigrammatically "surds of metaphysics"; nor by "relegating some of them to the sphere of mystery and some of them to the book of riddles," or by saying that "these and similar double notions, instead of being anomalies, are among the higher and more potent instruments of human thought." Nor is it of any avail to protest against the pedantry of forcing into the Procrustean bed of a system the unsystematic *aperçus* of primitive thinkers. In the case of the Pre-Socratics, where we possess only fragments, such warnings may be needful. In the case of Plato they are a mere evasion. It is not necessary to re-open the tiresome debate as to whether Plato did or did not have a system. His mind and writings were dominated by certain leading thoughts and feelings which his style everywhere implicitly suggests, even where they are not distinctly formulated. The growth and connection of these ideas in his mind was not the result of accident. It is the part of the historian to detect these predominating thoughts, to analyze Plato's attempted solutions of the problems of metaphysics and morals into their elements and compare them with the nearest modern analogues. But Professor Jowett, while perhaps over-quick to note and express picturesque resemblances in matters of feeling and the play of social life, has apparently no eye for those deeper analogies that are revealed by analysis. Thus he tells us that we no longer debate the problem of the one and the many—the co-existence of unity and plurality. But a glance at the last chapter of Professor James's smaller psychology or a little reflection on the interminable debates respecting Kant's synthetic unity would show that we have merely transferred the puzzle to psychology. It would be an interesting study to show definitely the relation of the Platonic problem of the metaphysical unity of the idea in its multiform manifestations to the modern psychologist's difficulty in assigning the postu-

lated unity of cognitive functions to a soul that can manifest itself only through infinitely divisible nervous tissue. Instead of attempting such a study, Professor Jowett puts us off with the ingenious fancy (it is nothing more) that the co-existence of unity and plurality in the idea was to Plato a mystery like that of the co-existence of unity and trinity in the Deity to a trinitarian.

Again, "to appreciate fully the drift of the Euthydemus," he says, "... we should imagine a mental state . . . in which the ideas of space, time, matter, motion were proved to be contradictory and imaginary, in which the nature of qualitative change was a puzzle." But to find this state of mind we need go no further than Herbert Spencer's chapters on the Unknowable, or the strange debate between Spencer and Mill on the meaning of 'same,' or the modern problem of problems: Can evolution evolve qualitative differences out of quantitative? Once more he tells us (II 24) that "the question which Plato has raised respecting the origin and nature of ideas belongs to the infancy of philosophy; in modern times it would no longer be asked." With what questions, then, are Max Müller's *Science of Thought* and Romanes' *mental evolution* concerned? The origin and nature of our ideas is surely the central question of recent philosophy. We approach the problem from the psychological side and ask, Can we establish a distinction of kind between our ideas and the images and sensations of brutes? But those who would escape materialism and the 'flowing philosophers' will also in the end be forced to investigate the relation of 'ideas' to objective reality, and so to face the problems of the Parmenides.

As a result of this lack of definiteness and precision in the conception and statement of philosophic questions, we find intermingled with the fine sayings that adorn these pages an equal number of errors, misleading suggestions, fantastic analogies, misconceived criticisms of Plato, epigrammatic evasions of serious problems, and Hegelian passages of what Ruskin calls "pure, definite and highly finished nonsense."

For example, it is fanciful to find in *Phaedrus* 247 D "the assertion of the essentially moral nature of God"; as it is to cite *Phaedrus* 246 C to illustrate first the Cartesian union of mind and body, and second the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz; or to see a "reminiscence of the *ὁμοιομερῆ* and the world-soul of the *Timaeus* in the monads of Leibnitz which really came from the Platonic idea (*Phileb.* 15 B *μονάδας*), and the Lucretian atoms by way of Giordano Bruno. Plato's disparagement of geometry as a science that, unlike dialectic, is forced to employ sensuous representatives of ideal truths is not a conception of a geometry in which figures are to be dispensed with, nor even in a dim and distant way an anticipation of modern analytic geometry. Socrates' words in *Phaedo* 97 B are not "a mysterious reference to another science (mathematics?) of generation and destruction for which he is vainly feeling" (II 189). They refer simply to the doctrine of causation by 'presence' of the idea which he is about to expound. It is not true that the distinction drawn by Protagoras (*Protag.* 351 B) between the courageous and the confident is futile. It blocks the argument of Socrates on that line, and forces him to turn in another direction. It is inaccurate to say (I 413, II 16) "that the soul which had seen truths in the form of the universal (*Phaedr.* 248 C, 249 C) cannot again return to the nature of an animal." Plato does not oppose good

and knowledge in the Charmides in contrast to his identification of them elsewhere (I 7), but merely affirms as often that no knowledge except knowledge of the good is always and necessarily a good. The definition 'doing one's own business' of temperance (tentatively) in the Charmides, and of justice in the Republic, does not show the "shifting character of the Platonic philosophy" (I 5), if we bear in mind the context and Laws 696 C [*ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε δίκαιον οὐ φύεται χωρὶς τοῦ σωφρονεῖν*].

It is no disparagement of Plato's philosophy of language to say that "he had no idea that language is a natural organism (I 281)"; for his idea that language is an instrument (*ὄργανον*) is far truer. It is a misconception to treat the "assertion that an agent and a patient may be described by similar predicates" as a mistake which "Aristotle (Eth. Nic. V 1. 4, XI 11) partly shares and partly corrects" and as an example of robust sophistry in Plato (II 294). For owing to the greater regularity of the Greek language, what is sometimes called the fallacy of paronymous terms in English was generally a legitimate locus for inferences in Greek, and Plato, while aware of the difficulty, thinks it conducive to edification to keep the same associations with both active and passive. Gorgias 476 B must be interpreted by Laws 860 A *ἐὰν δέ γε δίκαιον μὲν ὁμολογῶμεν, αἰσχρὸν δὲ εἶναι πάθος, διαφωνήσει τὸ τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ καλόν*, etc. There is no real inconsistency between the doctrine of punishment set forth in the Gorgias and Republic 380 A B (II 298), and the seeming inconsistency may be explained by Laws 728 B C. The criticism on the doctrine of the quadripartite line (III xcν), that the relation of shadows to objects does not correspond to the relation of numbers to ideas, ignores the fact that Plato's division is based not on differences in the objects but in the methods or processes of cognition (cf. Rep. 534 A and *infra*, p. 365).

The remarks on the *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος* (III 385 and IV 16) are plausible but beside the point. The argument is that if the likeness of particulars necessitates the assumption of a common type (the idea), then by parity of reasoning the resemblance of the particular and the idea involves another type from which this likeness is derived. The logic of this argument is untouched by Jowett's remark that "the mind, after having obtained a general idea, does not really go on to form another which includes that and all the individuals contained under it." There is nothing in the Timaeus to confirm the statement (III 391) "that the pattern (by which the world was created) though eternal is a creation." Republic 511 does not say that "objects of sense only receive their true meaning when they are incorporated in a principle which is above them" (IV 315), but that the non-sensuous conceptions of the mathematics and the arts belong to the domain of the 'understanding' as usually studied, but are objects of the higher reason if taken in connection with first principles. The criticism of the Philebus that "if we adopt the test of definiteness the pleasures of the body are more capable of being defined than other pleasures" (IV 531) betrays a failure to grasp the essential meaning of *ἀπειρος* as applied to *ἡδονή*. It is not true that Aristotle is in advance of Plato in affirming that pleasure is not in the body at all (IV 532), for this is the Platonic doctrine (cf. Timaeus 69 D, Philebus 43; Phaedo 66 C does not really assert the contrary). This appears even from the passage of Aristotle (Eth. Nic. X 3. 6) cited by Professor Jowett, for the words *οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ* express not Aristotle's opinion, but

as often the universally accepted view or the view of the very opponents against whom he is arguing. I will not pause to criticise or attempt to fathom the meaning of "the Kantian conception of an *a priori* synthetical proposition 'one is'" (IV 32) or "the individual is the synthesis of the universal and the particular" (III clxi), or of the statement that "the philosophy of Berkeley could never have had any meaning even to himself, if he had first analyzed from every point of view the conception of matter," or of the criticism "that the being and not-being of Plato never merge in each other, though he is aware that determination is only negation" (IV 18).

Professor Jowett writes very prettily round and about the larger questions of the Platonic philosophy, but instead of a precise investigation of Plato's meaning, he too often contents himself with an evasive flourish about the 'shifting character of Plato's thought,' or the tentative nature of all early speculative efforts. The introductions to the Charmides, Lysis and Laches, for example, practically ignore the fundamental question of the relation of these 'Socratic' dialogues to the doctrine of the Republic and the Laws. In the Laws Plato repeatedly affirms his intention of eschewing verbal eristic, such as he implies that he has permitted himself elsewhere, and he expressly admits that the identification of knowledge in the ordinary sense, and virtue is a way of speaking conducive to edification. In view of this shall we regard the treatment of *φιλία*, *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀνδρεία* in the Lysis, Charmides and Laches, as embodying Plato's best thought at the time, or are they merely dramatic dialectical exertions? The question must at least be asked. At any rate, it is not permissible to affirm generally (I 3) "that in the philosophy of Plato *σωφροσύνη* still retains an intellectual element . . . and is not yet relegated to the sphere of moral virtue, as in the Nichomachean ethics of Aristotle" (cf. Laws 696 sqq.).

Similarly the treatment of the teachableness of virtue in the introductions to the Protagoras and Meno is vague and uncertain. It is quite true that "Plato is desirous of deepening the notion of education, and therefore asserts the paradox that there are no teachers" (II 7). But it is only half true that "Plato means to say that virtue is not brought to a man, but must be drawn out of him and cannot be taught by rhetorical discourses or citations from the poets" (I 116), and it is utterly misleading to say that in the Meno the answer to the question whether virtue can be taught is supplied out of the doctrine of ideas. Plato, who, like all reformers, relied chiefly on education, never doubted but that for all practical purposes 'virtue' can be taught. This appears sufficiently from the allegory of the ship in the Republic. It is the mutinous sailors who affirm that the art of navigation cannot be taught (cf. Laws 644 A οἱ γε ὁρθῶς πεπαιδευμένοι σχεδὸν ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται). The ethical virtues are taught by the development of instinctive right feeling and convictions, through discipline maintained from early youth. These virtues can be brought to a man and instilled into him, in part through citations from the poets (under censorship) and rhetorical discourses (Laws *passim*). Intellectual virtue, on the contrary, is an innate faculty of the soul which teaching cannot produce, but only direct from unworthy to worthy objects (Rep. 518). Plato admits the effectiveness of the education of public opinion (Protag. 325; Rep. 492) and the more systematic instruction of the Sophists. But these

agencies are often misdirected and lack unity of purpose. He would employ the forces of both for the education of his ideal city, in which ordinary ethical virtue would be a normal product of the state machinery (Rep. 500 D), while the higher intellectual virtue would be preserved and converted to noble ends whenever it appeared. Under the present régime of chance nothing less than a special providence can save from corruption a soul endowed with the higher faculties. Hence the virtue of such men may be truly said to come *θεία μοίρα* by grace divine (Meno 99, interpreted by Rep. 493 A).

Once more, we are not much advanced in knowledge of the doctrine of ideas by being told that "they are the ever-varying expression of Plato's idealism," or that they are a "great theory of knowledge which Plato in various ways and under various forms of expression is seeking to unfold," or that their various forms "are not to be regarded seriously as having any meaning," but that their "great diversity shows the tentative character of early endeavors to think." A truly philosophic treatment of the subject would show us definitely how the theory of ideas seemed to Plato the only alternative to an impracticable nominalism in logic, a sensationalist psychology, a philosophy of relativity and a materialistic view of the world. *ἡ πολλαπλάσιον τὸ ἔργον.*

A philosopher is required to translate a philosopher, and Professor Jowett's belletristic attitude towards philosophy impairs the value of his translation for serious students. One who reads for pleasure, inspiration and the general effect is charmed by the ease, grace and perfect propriety of the English, and accepts the translator's dictum that nothing would be gained by a pedantic and punctilious conformity to the structure of the Greek sentence. But suppose a reader wishes to catch the exact nuance of Plato's thought in some matter where thought and feeling surpass the subtlety of language many times at the best. He will desire either a facsimile of the original, by patient study of which he may puzzle out the meaning for himself, or a 'compensating' version made with an unerring instinct born of a profound insight into the author's thought. Jowett's pretty periphrases, elegant 'compensations' and ingenious abbreviations are a constant delight to a reader who seeks only the charm, the wit and the dramatic life of the dialogues. They will, even in this substantially correct third edition, frequently mislead the reader who wishes to follow the argument. The translator's habit of allowing the Greek to fade from his mind while he writes out its purport in idiomatic English, would be safe only if he had a sure grasp of the Platonic philosophy as a whole. And this he has not. As it is, he abbreviates a seemingly superfluous expression and omits a qualification which cannot be spared; he substitutes a convenient synonym and alters the associations of an entire paragraph; he introduces a compensating embellishment which implicitly contradicts the whole tenor of the argument. And the case is not bettered by the fact that in a majority of instances a popular jury would pronounce the difference insignificant. One of the best lessons that the student learns from Plato is not to be content with an *à peu près*. Moreover, while this translation is stylistically very easy reading, it is in respect of the evolution of the thought often far more difficult than the original. Especially in the *Parmenides*, *Philebus*, *Sophist* and *Statesman* does one come upon passages which upon reconsideration he admits to be correct and marvels of ingenious yet idiomatic translation, but

which require two or three readings in order to be understood ; when a closer version expressed in a less Latinized vocabulary would have been apprehended at once. It is true that modern English does not emphasize and make explicit the connecting links of thought like Platonic Greek, but what do readers of the Parmenides or the Sophist care for conventional English? There is much plausibility in Professor Jowett's claim that "it is a mistaken attempt at precision always to translate the same Greek word by the same English word." But it is an inaccuracy for which the careful reader can learn to make allowance. By study of the context he can gradually build up in his mind a true conception for the fixed conventional representative of an ambiguous or technical term, just as the student of the Greek does for the corresponding Greek word. And he will prefer the method of translation that makes this possible, to the confusion introduced by Professor Jowett's somewhat capricious substitution of synonyms for such words as λόγος, δόξα, φρόνησις, σοφία, σωφροσύνη, for example. It would be far better to render λόγος everywhere by 'speech' or 'discourse' than to translate it now by 'ideas' (II 166), now by 'thought' (Phaedo 100 A, Philebus 15), and again by 'reason' (IV 527), or 'understanding' contrasted with imagination (IV 537), or 'understanding' opposed to reason (Phileb. 62 A). And it is safer to translate δόξα everywhere by 'opinion' than to paraphrase ὁρθὴ δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμη by 'truth and appearance' (II 16) or render ἀληθινῆς δόξης ἑταῖρος 'companion of true glory' (Phaedr. 253 D). The word σωφροσύνη presents a good test-case. It is best rendered 'sobriety,' though it has no single equivalent in English. In the Charmides, where an attempt is made to define the term, Jowett translates it now by 'temperance,' now by 'wisdom' and by 'temperance or wisdom' at the point of transition from one meaning to the other. Its primary meaning seems to be 'soundness' or 'safeness' of mind, sense and sobriety, as appears e. g. in Protag. 333 C ἀρά τις σοι δοκεῖ ἀδικῶν ἀνθρώπος σωφρονεῖν; The two chief derived meanings are (1) self-restraint in the matter of the appetites, continence, and (2) self-restraint as shown in submission to lawful authority, 'minding one's own business.' It is only from this idea of 'knowing one's place' that it gets the connotation of 'self-knowledge,' and hence should not be translated simply by 'wisdom' when the intellectual aspect is to be emphasized, but by some paronym of knowledge. The synonyms employed by Professor Jowett not only make it difficult for the English reader to follow the argument of the Charmides, which becomes, like many of Plato's arguments in a loose translation, too grossly fallacious, but they seem to have confused the translator himself. For, surely, the virtue that Charmides has already learned is not self-knowledge, but common, every-day temperance (I 7), and in submitting himself to the instruction of Socrates he is giving proof not of his 'temperance,' but of his soundness of mind or good sense (I 76). The relation of temperance and wisdom in Plato's mind is best shown by a passage (Laws 710 A) which is thus translated by Jowett: "Yes, Cleinias, temperance in the vulgar sense; *not that which in the forced and exaggerated language of some philosophers is called prudence*, but that which is the natural gift of children and animals, some of which live continently and others incontinently, but, when isolated, was, as we said, hardly worth reckoning in the catalogue of goods." A more correct version of this passage would run as follows: "Yes, Cleinias, temperance, in the

popular sense; not that temperance which a man might magnify in his discourse constraining us to identify it with wisdom, but that quality which is, so to speak, the bloom on the peach, in some young boys and animals that are naturally continent in pleasure, while others are incontinent—the quality, I mean, which, when isolated from the generally recognized goods (of the soul), was hardly worth consideration.” In this version, the retention of the metaphor in *ἐπαυθεῖ* and the detailed rendering of the last clause are matters of taste, but Jowett’s translation of the italicized words is positively misleading. The *σεμύνειν*, or rhetorical magnifying for the sake of edification is not the “forced and exaggerated language of certain philosophers”: it is a constant feature of Plato’s own style in treating ethical subjects. He employs it in relation to these very ideas a few pages back (Laws 689, 696 C), where he distinguishes *σοφός* in the sense of ‘clever,’ from *σοφός* as ‘wise’ in the only true wisdom, which is the harmony of desire and will and ‘fear of the Lord.’ Again, *φρόνησις* must not be translated ‘prudence’ here; it is a synonym of *σοφία* in the sense of the higher wisdom. Professor Jowett’s remarks on these words in the index s. v. Wisdom (V 537) misrepresent their true relation. *σοφία*, he says, means wisdom “in the higher sense, the highest combination of virtue and intelligence,” while *φρόνησις* has “the narrower significance of prudence or forethought and contains less of the moral element.” Now, the two words, as we have just seen, are sometimes used interchangeably by Plato as synonyms of the ‘higher wisdom.’ But *σοφός* and *σοφία* throughout Greek literature have properly nothing to do with morality; they denote cleverness, intellectual ability and the skill of the specialist. The dramatists and Plato sometimes employ *σοφία* for the wisdom which is virtue, but Plato always with the consciousness that he is wresting a good word from the service of the wicked (Theaetetus. 176 C D). *φρόνησις* and *φρονεῖν*, on the contrary, from the beginning belong to the world of conduct which in its higher aspect is the world of morality. Primitive morality was almost wholly prudential, and this fact, and the English associations of ‘prudence,’ have misled Professor Jowett. But to Plato *σοφία* was more contaminated with the associations of unscrupulous cleverness than *φρόνησις* with those of selfish prudence. The translator, indeed, not infrequently fails to appreciate the Platonic nicety of language in ethical matters. E. g. Rep. 389 D *σωφροσύνης δὲ ὡς πλήθει οὐ τὰ τοιαύτα μέγιστα*, etc., is rendered “are not the chief elements of temperance *speaking generally*,” etc. But *ὡς πλήθει* means ‘for the multitude’ and is half contemptuous. So in 442 E *τὰ φορτικὰ αὐτῷ προσφέροντες* is more than a ‘few commonplace instances.’ Emerson somewhere, speaking of an antinomian higher rule of life, says “Does any man think this rule too easy—let him keep its commandments one day.” Plato’s meaning is that the higher philosophic virtue will stand all the vulgar tests of ordinary morality which it is almost an insult to apply; cf. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. X 8 (*ἡ φορτικὸς ὁ ἐπαινος*); for, as Leslie Stephens says: “the moral law can be stated unconditionally when it is stated in the form ‘be this,’ but not when stated in the form ‘do this.’” Again, in Republic 430 C *ἀποδέχονται τοῖνυν τοῦτο ἀνδρείαν εἶναι, καὶ γὰρ ἀποδέχου, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, πολιτικὴν γε*—the rendering “and if you add the words ‘of a citizen’ you will not be far wrong” fails to bring out the force of the limitation. Socrates wishes to restrict his definition to that demotic virtue (intermediate between

the mere virtue of temperament and that of philosophy), *ἐξ ἑθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἀνεν φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ*, which he so disparages in the *Phaedo* (82 B) and of which in its higher form the Platonic statesman who plays providence with the vulgar sort is in a sense the creator—*δημιουργός* (*Rep.* 500 D). Jowett renders *τὴν δημοτικὴν τε καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν* (*Phaedo* 82 B) “the civil and social virtues,” etc., and we accordingly find temperance duly entered in the index as “a social virtue,” a statement which would sadly bewilder any modern student of ethics who should attempt to “hold the eel of science by the tail” by index-learning.

This index, covering 175 pages, is a piece of work for which all who use these volumes should be grateful to Mr. Knight. Even scholars familiar with the Platonic text will find their account in such articles as those under Athens, Education, Etymology, Homer, Greek Life, Model City, Music, Personification, Proverbs, Socrates. And in the brief, pregnant résumés of leading points of Platonic doctrine contributed by the translator (under the entries Courage, Education, God, Ideas, Justice, Music, Dialectic, Soul, the State, Temperance, Virtue, Wisdom) the English reader will find as good a primer of Platonism as he could desire, expressed in Professor Jowett’s happiest style. Nevertheless, an index made from an English translation, and a translation as ‘free’ as this one, inevitably contains much that is misleading. It is constantly associating things whose sole bond of connection is the translator’s caprice in his choice of English synonyms, and it thus serves as a most effective demonstrator of the misconceptions to which seemingly innocent infidelities may give rise. Suppose, to take the first example that comes to hand, that the Professor of Psychology consults the article ‘Attention.’ He will be referred to Euthyphron 13 for the “various meanings of the word” and to Theaetetus 153 B for the doctrine that attention “is a motion of the soul.” And if he is a rash man he may credit Plato with a vague anticipation of the theories of Ribot. But if he is prudent he will consult his colleague the Greek Professor, who will tell him that in Euthyphron 13 it has pleased Professor Jowett to translate by attention a word (*θεραπεία*) which means service, service of the gods, while in Theaetetus 153 B the Greek for attention is *μελέτη* ‘study-practice.’ We have already seen that the Professor of Ethics would be sent to *Phaedo* 82 B for the doctrine that “temperance is a social virtue.” Many similar erroneous suggestions and arbitrary associations of Platonic loci could be pointed out, the greater part of them due to the same cause. Thus the association (under “Art and the Conditions of Art”) of *Phaedrus* 268–9 and *Laws* 4, 709 C is a mere equivocation on the word ‘condition’; the loci collected under “argument, courtesy required in” were surely never brought into juxtaposition before; Theaetetus 201 E and *Timaeus* 51 C are not both statements of the doctrine that the “elements are names only”; the community of feeling ironically attributed to himself and Callicles by Socrates in *Gorgias* 481 D has nothing to do with that postulated as a social ideal, *Rep.* 5, 463; Euthydemus 296 cannot be cited for ‘innate ideas’; that ‘Induction is the source of knowledge’ cannot be legitimately inferred from *Laws* 12, 965; *Phaedrus* 242 does not say that ‘love is a mighty God,’ for if it did it would contradict the *Symposium*, and Plato, except in translation, does not contradict himself—the statement is “love is either a god or something divine”; *Philebus* 31 B, 41 E, 49 A do not assign

pain to the mixed class, in contradiction of 28 A, etc., which assign it to the infinite; nor does Laws 3, 693 contradict Theaetetus 172 A in respect of the affirmation that 'expediency' (say rather 'utility') is the aim of the legislator.

I will conclude with a partial list of errors detected in the course of a hasty perusal of the principal dialogues. The list probably includes at least half of all the mistakes that a careful scrutiny would discover. I have not examined the Laws further than to note that many errors have been corrected and some still remain.

Republic.

341 οὐδὲν ὦν καὶ ταῦτα of course does not mean "and you failed."

344 E. This is now nearly right; but why is ἤτοι translated "rather" instead of "or else"?

404 B ἀπλῆ πον καὶ ἐπιεικὴς γυμναστικὴ means "not over-precise and rigid in its prescriptions," not merely "simple and good."

437 D ἐπιθυμιῶν τι φήσομεν εἶναι εἶδος κ. τ. λ.—not "admitting this to be true of desire generally, let us suppose a particular class of desires, and out of them we will select hunger and thirst, as they are termed, which are the most obvious of them"; but "In view of this, then, shall we say that desires are a (distinct) class (in the soul) and that the most clearly marked of them are those which we term thirst and hunger?" This, the only rendering that the Greek will bear, is confirmed by 439 E ταῦτα . . . δύο ἡμῖν ὀρίσθω εἶδη ἐν ψυχῇ ἐνόντα, which, by the way, is somewhat incorrectly translated: "Then let us *finally* determine that there are two principles existing in the soul."

464 E ἀνάγκην σωμάτων ἐπιμελεία τιθέντες—not "we shall make the protection of the person a matter of necessity," but "compelling them [by the indirect effect of our legislation, cf. 556 A ἀναγκάζων ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοὺς πολίτας] to develop their muscle"; cf. 407 B ἡ περιττὴ αὐτῇ ἐπιμέλεια τοῦ σώματος.

473 A "I want to know whether ideals are ever fully realized in language? Does not the word express more than the fact, and must not the actual, whatever a man may think, always, in the nature of things, fall short of the truth?" This is completely "upset." The correct version would run: "Can anything be accomplished in deed exactly as it is expressed in word, or is there a natural necessity that action should less lay hold of truth and reality than diction, whatever some people may assert?" Plato is inverting the familiar Greek antithesis of word and deed and challenging the Democritean Λόγος ἔργον σκιά. "Words," the ὄργανον of the dialectician, embody more of the truth of the idea than the "deeds" of the practical man. Cf. Phaedo 100 A οὐ γὰρ πάντῃ ξυγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις, where the thought is wholly misrepresented by Jowett's rendering: "For I am very far from admitting that he who contemplates existences through the medium of thought sees them only 'through a glass darkly' any more than he who considers them in action and operation." And as a result of this translation he tells us, with a reference to Phaedo 100 A (Intr. to Meno, vol. II, p. 13), that the ideas "are not more certain than facts, but they are equally certain," whatever that may mean.

488 E. The text here will always be doubtful. Sidgwick's οἰομένῃ (J. of P. X 275) is perhaps the best reading. Whatever the text, it is certain that it is the true pilot, not the mob, who doubts the possibility of uniting the pilot's art

with the politician's skill in getting control of the helm, "whether other people like it or not." The translator here takes a flying shot at the general meaning and misses it: "and that he must and will be the steerer, whether other people like it or not—the possibility of this union of authority with the steerer's art has never seriously entered into their thoughts," etc.

490 D ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὠρισάμεθα; cf. 486 E μὴ δοκοῦμεν . . . οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα. The translation "which question of necessity brought us," etc., misses the point.

493 C. Not "except that the just and noble are the necessary," but "should apply the terms just and noble to (mere) necessities." There is a difference. So in 493 D read not "And yet the reasons are utterly ludicrous which they give in confirmation of their own notions about the honorable and good," but "and yet as proof that these things [necessary accommodations to popular estimates] are really honorable and good, did you ever hear from one of them an argument that was not absurd?"

498 A πλῆσιόσαντες, κτέ. Not "when they come within sight of the great difficulty of the subject, take themselves off," but "after devoting themselves (for a time) to the hardest part of it," etc. The point is not that they are frightened away, but that they wrongly begin with the hardest part of the subject; cf. *infra*, 498 B.

523 C. Not "gives no more vivid idea of anything in particular than of its opposite," but "no more affirms (shows) any one (quality or predicate) than its opposite."

525 B ἢ μηδέποτε λογιστικῶ γενέσθαι. The translation "and therefore he must be an arithmetician" is incomprehensibly wrong. Read: "or else [i. e. if he does not rise out of the sea of change by study of the abstract verities of mathematics] he can never become a true reckoner" (sc. in the 'calculations' of the philosophic reason).

526 E εἰάν τις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν ἐπιχειρῇ τῷ λόγῳ τέμνειν. The translator makes an unnecessary mystery of this. His note is: "meaning either (1) that they integrate the number because they deny the possibility of fractions; or (2) that division is regarded by them as a process of multiplication, for the fractions of one continue to be units." The meaning is simply that in any mathematical calculation you must keep your adopted units consistently the same, although from another point of view they may not be units. Some power of abstraction is required to do this, for there is no object of sense that cannot be divided into parts; cf. James's *Psychology*, II 655. This imaginary mystery seems to haunt Professor Jowett. He alludes to it again, *Introduction to Timaeus*, III 386–87.

526 B C. Not "you will not easily find a more difficult study *and not many as difficult*," but "you will not find many studies more difficult, nor find them easily."

534 A. Not "let us defer the further correlation and subdivision of the subjects of opinion and of intellect," but "let us pass over their objective correlates, the opinable that is and the intelligible, and their respective subdivisions."

540 B. Instead of "not as though they were performing some heroic action, but simply as a matter of duty," read "regarding it (however) as a necessary rather than as an honorable and desirable task." There is no suggestion of "heroism" and "duty" in the Greek.

553 D. Not "of all changes . . . there is none so speedy and sure as the conversion of the ambitious youth into the avaricious one," but simply "this (the above described) is the quickest and surest conversion of," etc.

575 C. "a small catalogue of evils, even if the perpetrators of them are few in number." "Even" is not in the Greek and reverses the meaning.

576 D. Not "we must not allow ourselves to be panic-stricken at the apparition of the tyrant, who is only a unit and may perhaps have a few retainers about him," but "let us not be dazzled by the aspect of the tyrant, who is only one man [so that, even if adopting for the moment the vulgar estimate, we deem him and his few retainers happy, this happiness cannot outweigh the misery of the majority], nor by (the seeming happiness of) his few familiars about his person." The translator has missed the connection of thought and the force of the Greek idiom here.

579 C. Commentators have, strangely, failed to note that *ταῖς τοιοῦτοις κακοῖς* is the measure of the excess of the unhappiness of the tyrant soul that attains its desire, compared with the tyrant soul that is confined to the life of a private citizen. "Amid evils such as these" is accordingly wrong.

581 C *λέγωμεν τὰ πρῶτα*, etc. Not "we may *begin* by assuming," etc., but "that the three primary classes," etc.

581 D E. Both text and translation here exhibit defective feeling for Greek idiom. Hermann's text, or something like it, is the only idiomatic one, and *τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πᾶν πόρρω* cannot possibly mean that the philosopher "is not so far indeed from the heaven of pleasure," but must express the philosopher's opinion of the pleasurable of the lower pleasures compared with the higher.

607 A. Instead of "For if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind, *which by common consent have ever been deemed best*, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our state," read "pleasure and pain shall be the lords of your city, instead of law *and the rule that the common reason shall from time to time have pronounced to be the best.*"

611 B *οὐ βῆδιον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αἰδίων εἶναι σύνθετόν τε ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ μὴ τῇ καλλίστῃ κεχρημένον σύνθεσει, ὥς νῦν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ἡ ψυχῇ*. Instead of "The soul, I said, being, as is now proven, immortal, must be the fairest of compositions and cannot be compounded of many elements," read "It is not easy (possible) for a thing to be immortal that is compounded of many elements and not compounded in the fairest way, as now seemed to us to be the case with the soul." *ὥς νῦν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη* refers back to 603 D *μυρίων τοιούτων ἐναντιωμάτων ἅμα γενομένων ἡ ψυχῇ γέμει ἡμῶν* or to the repetition of the language of 603 D in 611 B, just above: *ὥστε πολλῆς ποικιλίας . . . γέμειν*, etc. This passage is generally misinterpreted.

Meno.

74 D E. Carelessness in the rendering of one sentence leads to positive error in its successor: "What is that lower nature which you designate as figure—which contains straight as well as round and is no more one than the other—that would be your mode of speaking!? Men. Yes, Soc., and in speaking thus you do not mean to say that the round is round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than round." The correct translation is: "which contains straight as well as round, so that round is no more (truly) figure than

is straight . . . and in speaking thus you do not mean that round is no more truly round than it is straight, nor that straight is no more truly straight than it is round."

75 C. *εἰεν* is wrongly transferred from Meno to Socrates.

92 A. "no, Socrates: the young men who gave their money to them [sc. the Sophists] were out of their minds, and their relations and guardians who entrusted the youth to the care of these men were still more out of their minds." The words *τούτων δ' ἐτι μᾶλλον οἱ τούτοις ἐπιτρέποντες οἱ προσήκοντες* are misconstrued. They mean "and still more (mad) than these (the youths) their relatives, who permitted them (to resort to the Sophists)."

93 D E. Instead of "here was a teacher of virtue who you admit to be among the best men of the past," translate "This is the kind of teacher of virtue he was, and yet you admit that he was among," etc.

95 C. Instead of "I often wonder, Socrates, that Gorgias is never heard promising to teach virtue," etc., read "This is just what I admire (approve) most in Gorgias, that he is never heard," etc. *ἀγαμαί* does not mean 'wonder.'

Protagoras.

310 D. "courageous madness" is very infelicitous for *τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν πτοίησιν*.

320 D *τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ θεοὶ γῆς ἔνδον ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρὸς μίξαντες καὶ τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γῇ κεράννυνται*. The last words do not mean "and various mixtures of both elements"; they are a periphrasis for the other two elements, air and water; cf. Timaeus 31-32, Phileb. 29 A B.

327 E. "and you, Socrates, are discontented" is infelicitous for *νῦν δὲ τρυφᾷς*.

336 E. The words "and this led Alcibiades, who loves opposition, to take the other side" are merely a plausible variation on the Platonic text, which simply says "and Alcibiades carries the pertinacity of the partisan into everything that he undertakes." Alcibiades does not take Socrates' part out of pure love of opposition.

346 B *καὶ ἐχθρας ἐκουσίους πρὸς ταῖς ἀναγκαίαις προστίθεσθαι* cannot possibly mean "in order that the odium which is necessarily incurred by them (the parents) may be increased." It is rather "and thus they (the sons) incur ill-will of their own accord, in addition to that which is unavoidable (through their parents' unhappy temper)."

346 E. The words *ὥστε τούτων γε ἔνεκα οὐδένα ἐπαινέσομαι* must, I think, mean "so that, so far as this goes (in respect of this), I shall have to praise no man." The words are the counterpart of *ὥστε μὴ ψέγειν* above. Simonides is willing not to censure the moderately good, and he will not waste his time seeking for a flawless man, and so, in the meantime, avoid the necessity of praising any. This shade of meaning escapes in Jowett's "In this sense I praise no man," which also fails to account for the future *ἐπαινέσομαι*.

356 E-357 C. The loose translation here does not bring out clearly the dialectical evolution of Socrates' thought, and in two instances falls into positive error. The translator ignores the difference between *ἡ μετρητική* (which, strictly speaking, deals with *μήκη*) and *μετρητική* or *μ. τις* any measuring of *ὑπερβολῆς* and *ἐνδείας*. To the middle of 353 E we are concerned with *ἡ μετρητική*. Then, on the hypothesis that salvation depended on the desire for more or less in relation to odd and even, Socrates shows that salvation would

then depend on (1) knowledge, (2) *μετρητική τις*, (3) to wit, *ἀριθμητική*. The translation does not bring this out, and in 357 A is erroneous. Instead of "what would be the saving principle of our lives? Would not knowledge? a knowledge of measuring when the question is one of excess and defect, and a knowledge of number when the question is of odd and even," read "would it not be knowledge (of some kind), and would it not be (further) a knowledge of measurement (*μετρητική τις*), inasmuch as (*ἐπειδὴ περ*) the art postulated (*ἡ τέχνη*) is an art concerned with excess and defect; and since, further (*ἐπειδὴ δέ*), it is to be an art dealing with odd and even, can it be other than arithmetic?" (The specification is now complete.) These errors are repeated in the analogous passage, 357 A B. The third and actual hypothesis, Socrates continues, is that salvation depends on choice of more or less in pleasure and pain. The art of salvation is a *μετρητική*, because it deals with excess and defect (*ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας οὐσα*). *Being μετρητική*, it is necessarily *τέχνη* and *ἐπιστήμη*—what particular *ἐπιστήμη* we need not enquire. Jowett mistakes the force of the participle *οὐσα* here as he did that of its parallel *ἐπειδὴ περ* above, and renders: "Seeing that the salvation of human life has been found to consist in the right choice of pleasures and pains—in the choice of the more and the fewer—must not this measuring be a consideration of excess and defect and equality in relation to each other?"

Phaedrus.

235 A. "And I was doubting whether this [sc. the rhetorical manner] could have been defended by Lysias himself." *τοῦτο* is here wrongly referred to *τῷ ῥητορικῷ*. It refers back to *τὰ δέοντα εἰρηκότος*, etc., as the context would show, were it not for the loose translation of *τὰ δέοντα* by "sentiments."

242 E. "For if Love be, as he surely is, a divinity." Plato would not thus contradict the doctrine of the Symposium. Socrates says: "A god, or *something divine!*"

244 C. "rational investigation of futurity" is misleading for "investigation of futurity by men in their senses." The contemptuous tone of *ἀνθρωπίνῃ οἴσει* is lost in the reading "to human thought." Hence the reader of the translation not being informed that *οἴσεις* is a term of disparagement will not understand the statement that follows: that prophecy is more august than augury, both in *name* and fact.

253 A *καὶ τούτων δὴ τὸν ἐρώμενον αἰτῶμενοι* does not mean "the qualities of their god they attribute to the beloved," but "they regard the beloved as the cause of this (experience)."

253 D *ἀληθινῆς δόξης ἐταῖρος* is not "the follower of true glory," but "the associate of right opinion." The charioteer has knowledge like the *νοῦς* or the guardians, the good steed right opinion like the disciplined *θυμός* or the auxiliaries. The translation obscures an important Platonic doctrine.

269 E. Not "I conceive Pericles to have been the most accomplished of rhetoricians. Phaedr. What of that?," but "I conceive that there was a reason for Pericles having been the most accomplished of rhetoricians. Phaedr. Why so?"

270 D *ὅπερ ἐφ' ἑνός, τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ἐφ' ἐκάστων* is not "see first in the case of one and then in the case of all of them," but "see, as in the case (supposed) of a

simple unit, so in the case of each part of a compound." The following words : *τῷ τί ποιεῖν αὐτὸ πέφυκεν*, etc., cannot be construed "What is the power of acting or being acted upon which makes each and all of them to be what they are," but "wherein each of them is naturally adapted to act or be acted upon (by anything)." Cf. 271 A *ὅτω τι ποιεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ πέφυκεν*.

Lysis 217 E *καὶ τὸ μήτε κακὸν ἄρα μήτ' ἀγαθὸν ἐνίστε κακοῦ παρόντος οὐπω κακὸν ἐστίν, ἐστὶ δ' ὅτε ἡδὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον γέγονεν*. The last clause does not mean "and that has happened before now," but "and sometimes it has become so (sc. evil)." *ἐστὶ δ' ὅτε* is correlative with *ἐνίστε*.

Laches 189 A. Not "Socrates must be willing to allow that he is a good teacher, or I shall be a dull and uncongenial pupil," but "Let him (Solon) concede me this, that the teacher himself be a good man, or I shall appear a dullard, because I shall take no pleasure in his teaching."

Euthydemus 295 A. "You are incredulous, Socrates. Yes, I said, and I might well be incredulous, if I did not know you to be wise men"; render rather "Yes, I said, of all save your exceeding cleverness."

Cratylus 425 B. "and we must see whether the primary and also whether the secondary elements are rightly given or not, for if they are not, the composition of them, my dear Hermogenes, will be a sorry piece of work, and in the wrong direction." This is either erroneous or so 'free' as to be nearly meaningless. Socrates is not speaking of 'elements,' but of words, and he says that it is a sorry business to string together etymologies without distinguishing primitive and secondary formations, and analyzing the primitive words into their phonetic elements.

436 C *ἡ οὐκ ἐνενοήεις αὐτὸς λέγων ὡς πάντα κατὰ ταῦτὸν καὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτὸν ἐγίγνετο τὰ ὀνόματα*. Not "did you ever observe, in speaking, that all the words which you utter have a common character and purpose?", but "or did not you yourself observe, while you were speaking [sc. the preceding etymologies], that all the words appeared (were turning out) to be made on the same plan and to the same result?"

437 D E. Not "and when he has duly sifted them, all the rest will follow," but "and when that has been duly tested, then it must appear that the rest is in accord with it."

439 D 'Αρ' οὐν οἶόν τε προσεῖπεν αὐτὸ ὁρθῶς, εἰ ἀεὶ ὑπεξέρχεται, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκείνὸς ἐστίν, ἔπειτα ὅτι τοιοῦτον, etc. Not "and can we rightly speak of a beauty which is always passing away, and is first this and then that; must not the same thing be born and retire and vanish while the word is in our mouths?", but "Is it then possible to predicate of it rightly, if it is ever vanishing, first that it is 'that,' and next that it is of such or such a nature, or must it not ever, while the words are in our mouths, straightway become other, and slip away and no longer be the same?"

The translation of the *Timaeus* has been greatly improved in accuracy, harmony and simplicity with the aid of Mr. Archer-Hind's edition and the criticisms it called forth. Corrections suggested in these pages seem to have been adopted at 22 E, 24 B, 40 B, 52 B C, 55 A, and elsewhere. The sentence about the unmeaning employment of particles is silently dropped from the Introduction, but the exact force of the particles is still frequently ignored. Cf. οὖν, 48 A; δεῖ δὴ . . . τότε (τότε is wrong) γὰρ . . . τιθέμεθα δ' οὖν, 53 E-54 A; τότε γε μὴν, etc., 63 E; οὖν, 65 C.

77 B C πάσχον γὰρ διατελεῖ πάντα, στραφέντι δ' αὐτῷ, etc. These words are still wrongly rendered: "For this nature is always in a passive state, revolving in and about itself, repelling the motion from without and using its own," etc. I gave the correct translation after Zeller (A. J. P. X 74) some time ago, and showed why the force of the negative must be extended to the participle στραφέντι. There is really no doubt about the matter, and I have nothing to add except a reference to 64 B πάσχει μόνον.

50 A. Does not the parallelism μηδὲν ἐκεῖνο αὐ—μόνον ἐκεῖνο αὐ indicate that ἐκεῖνο in both cases refers to the πανδεχές? In that case μηδὲν τούτων is resumptive of τὸ δὲ ὅποιοντι, etc., not of τοῦτο and τόδε above, and the translation must run in outline: "the πανδεχές only (μόνον ἐκεῖνο) is to receive the predicates 'this' and 'that,' but of the predicates 'hot,' 'cold' and other pairs of opposites, the πανδεχές none (μηδὲν ἐκεῖνο) is to receive. This view is supported by the language of 51 A *in fine*.

Professor Jowett repeats his assertion that "the principle of the other, which is the principle of plurality and variation in the Timaeus, has nothing in common with the other of the Sophist, which is the principle of determination," and adds in this edition a page of vague and misleading reflections on the meaning of οὐσία in the ψυχογονία. To this I reply: (1) There is nothing in the Timaeus except the unintelligible use of θάτερον for the joints to suggest an identification of θάτερον with "the principle of irregularity and dissension . . . the residuum of chaos" . . . "the source of evil seen in the errors of man," etc. The passages (47 E sqq., 33 B) in which the 'residuum' is described do not mention or in any way imply θάτερον; and so far from manifesting itself in the errors of man, the circle of the θάτερον normally produces right opinion (37 B); (2) The functions of the circles of the same and the other in the souls of the universe and of man are to predicate sameness and difference rightly (44 B, 37 B C), and this, expressed in almost identical language, is the final object of the long investigation of ταῦτον θάτερον and οὐσία in the Sophist 260 C D; (3) Nor need the doctrine of οὐσία and its intermixture with ταῦτον and θάτερον occasion any difficulty. They are intermingled as in the Sophist 254 E δύο γένη τινὲ—ξυμμιγνύμενα μὴν ἐκείνοις ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἰεὶ (cf. 259 Λ). There are three or four οὐσῖαι, the οὐσῖαι of ἕτερον, ταῦτον and ὄν, each taken in abstract isolation, and the compound οὐσία or relative being in which they are all combined. The text of the Timaeus, as I have already shown in these pages, leaves some doubt as to the imagined details and stages of the combining process. But there is not the slightest doubt concerning the meaning of the ψυχογονία as a whole. Like is known by like. Accordingly Plato fantastically compounds the soul of the categories which the analysis of the Sophist found to be implied in all cognition; and this inextricable and doubly compound interminglement in the soul is symbolic of their strange mutual interpenetration in the dialectical process of thought (Sophist 240). That is all there is of it, and there is no occasion for rhetoric and mysticism, nor need we enquire (p. 422) whether Plato obtained his circles of the same and the other from some earlier thinker.

The five metaphysical dialogues in the fourth volume are very correctly translated. A simpler, less conventional English would have made the connection of thought clearer in many places (e. g. Parm. 142 E, 147 C D),

but Professor Campbell's revisions seem to have left practically no errors in the Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman, and a hasty perusal detects very few renderings in the Parmenides and Philebus that can be pronounced positively wrong.

Parmen. 156 D 'Αρ' οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, etc. Instead of "and does this strange thing really exist?" is it not possible to translate: "is this, then, the strange thing? (of which we were speaking)." The question does not seem to be of the existence of the *ἐξαίφνης*, but only whether it is the mysterious moment postulated by the argument.

Parmen. 157 B οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ περ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός ἐστιν. Not "inasmuch as there are things other than the one," but "inasmuch as they are other than the one."

162 A. The translation is improved here, but as the translator still retains the received text, he is obliged to "construe through a stone wall," in order to get any sense. I have endeavored to show (A. J. P. XII 349-53) that a transposition of one *μή* restores the sense and grammar to the passage which Aristotle found in it. But it is idle to argue the question so long as Greek scholars cannot be got to say whether it is or is not possible to construe: (*μετέχον*) *μή οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μή εἶναι μή ὄν*, "does not partake of the not-being of not-being." I hold that this construction is on its face impossible, and that we are therefore forced to interpret the passage in some other way.

Theaetetus. 165 A *μή προσέχων τοῖς ῥήμασι τὸν νοῦν ἢ τὸ πολλὸν εἰθίμεθα φάναι τε καὶ ἀπαρνείσθαι*. Not, I think, "if a person does not attend to the meaning of terms as they are commonly used in argument," but "which is the (careless) way in which we are for the most part accustomed to affirm and deny (say yes or no to any question)." Cf. Euthyd. 276 A sqq., where Cleinias is tripped because Socrates fails to warn him to be on his guard, *εὐλαβηθῆναι*, and Socrates' subsequent comment, *σὲ δὲ τοῦτο . . . διαλέλθῃ, ταῦτ' ὄνομα ἐπ' ἀνθρώποις ἐναντίως ἔχουσι κείμενον* (278 B).

Theaetetus. 177 E. Not "And as far as she has an opinion, the state imposes all laws with a view to the greatest expediency," but "to the best of her opinion and belief."

182 A. The translation is loose and the idiomatic force of *ἔτι* is missed. Instead of "and that the patient *ceases to be* a perceiving power and becomes a percipient," read "and that the patient is no longer (when we push our analysis to this point) to be regarded as (abstract) perception, but as a percipient" (accepting, as Jowett tacitly does, the reading *αἰσθανόμενον*). Below, in 182 B, the translation omits as surplusage the words *ἐν μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι*, which cannot be spared.

Politicus 266 C. "Human beings have come out in the same class with the freest and airiest of creation and have been running a race with them." The alternative interpretation, mentioned in the footnote, that pigs, not birds, are meant, is right. The English reader will conceive an exalted idea of the flexibility of the Greek language from the remark "according to this explanation we must translate the words above, 'freest and airiest of creation,' 'worthiest and laziest of creation.'" But it is not really possible to translate *γενναιωτάτῳ καὶ ἁμα εὐχερεστάτῳ* in either of these ways, but only (with Campbell) "grandest and least fastidious." Accordingly the bird-catcher below, "who, of all mankind, is most of an adept at the airy life," must be transformed

into a swineherd whose nature has been subdued to what it works in and who is therefore not squeamish or over-nice.

Philebus 19 C ἀλλὰ καλὸν μὲν τὸ ξύμπαντα γιγνώσκειν τῷ σώφρονι, δεύτερος δ' εἶναι πλοῦς δοκεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν αὐτὸν. The translation "Happy would be the wise man if he knew all things, and the next best thing for him is that he should know himself," is 'correct' in a sense, but does not convey the meaning. The passage is a subtly moralized Platonic version of the Hesiodic οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ, ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κάκεινος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθεται. Render: "A fine thing is universal knowledge—to the man of sober soul [without σωφροσύνη even ἐπιστήμη is not a good], but the next best thing is not to be unaware of one's own ignorance."

Phileb. 30 D E. "That mind *is the parent* of that class of the four which we call the cause of all." Even if we adopt the reading γενοῦστος, the word should not be rendered 'parent,' but 'kin(sman).' νοῦς is not the parent of αἰτία in the Platonic scheme.

33 B. "If so, the Gods, at any rate, cannot be supposed to have either joy or sorrow." 'If so' is misleading and not in the Greek. The sentence is an independent confirmation of the preceding argument, not an inference from it.

Phileb. 59 C ἐκείνων ὅτι μάλιστα ἐστὶ συγγενές. These words, I think, are wrongly related: instead of "or if not, at any rate what is most akin to them has," read "or if not, at any rate with that which is most akin to them."

66 D. "I understand; this third libation, Socrates, of which you spoke, meant a recapitulation." It does not seem to have been observed that this is the *third* recapitulation; cf. 19 C, 60 A.

Phaedo 99 A. "These muscles and bones of mine would have gone off to Megara . . . if they had been moved only by their own idea of what was best, and if I had not chosen the better and nobler part," etc. Render rather: "borne thither by (my) idea of what was best, if I had not thought it better and more honorable," etc. Socrates is explicitly denying all causal initiative to the parts of the body, and, though in other connections the 'body' and the 'flesh' might be said to have its own idea of good, it is grotesque to attribute such an idea to the bones and sinews here.

Gorgias 509 B. "and will not the worst of all defences be that with which a man is unable to defend himself or his family or his friends?" Rather: "is not this the defence, the inability to provide which for self or family or friends is the most disgraceful?"

Misprints are rare: ἐῶν ἐπαίνημι for ἐκὼν (I 124); Simmais for Simmias (II 256); Charimdes (I 13). The reference Laws 693, s. v. animal, should be Laws 963.

By a singular oversight, a characteristic sentence about Hebraism and Hellenism from the Preface to Matthew Arnold's Culture and Anarchy, is assigned to "Sir Wm. W. Hunter, Preface to Orissa." Sir Wm. Hunter merely quotes the passage as a motto for his book.

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